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Abstract: Over the last decade, the EU’s fundamental values have been under threat at the national 
level, in particular among several Central and Eastern European states that joined the EU since 2004. 
During this time, the European People’s Party (EPP) has been criticised for its unwillingness to vote for 
measures that would sanction the Hungarian Fidesz government, one of its members, in breach of key 
democratic principles since 2010. In this paper, we seek to understand how cohesive the EPP group has 
been on fundamental values related votes, how the position of EPP MEPs on these issues has evolved 
over time, and what explains intra-EPP disagreement on whether to accommodate rule of law offenders 
within the EU. To address these questions, we analyse the votes of EPP MEPs across 24 resolutions on 
the protection of EU fundamental values between 2011-2019. Our findings reveal below-average EPP 
cohesion on these votes, and a sharp increase in the tendency of EPP MEPs to support these resolutions 
over time. A number of factors explain the disagreements we find. While the EPP’s desire to maintain 
Fidesz within its ranks is central, this explanation does not offer a comprehensive account of the group’s 
accommodative behaviour. In particular, we find that ideological factors as well as the strategic interests 
of national governments at the EU level are central to understanding the positions of EPP MEPs, as 
well as the evolution of these positions over time. These results further our understanding of the nature 
of the obstacles to EU sanctions in rule of law abuse cases, and the role of partisanship in fuelling EU 









Over the last decade, the EU’s fundamental values concerning respect for democracy, pluralism and the 
rule of law have been under attack in several Member States of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
(Sitter & Bakke, 2019). The EU has been noted for its ineffectiveness in addressing this problem by 
failing to take measures that would stem backsliding on fundamental values (Kochenov, Magen, & 
Pech, 2016) and thereby protect its own ‘normative integrity’ (Lacey, 2017). Particularly puzzling in 
this regard is the behaviour of European Political Groups (EPGs) in the European Parliament (EP). 
While some EPGs have consistently attempted to use the limited powers of the EP to defend the EU’s 
fundamental values against backsliding, others have been much less consistent. This is particularly true 
of the EP’s largest EPG, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP). The EPP has adopted an 
accommodative attitude towards the Hungarian party Fidesz—a formerly conservative party turned 
Populist Radical Right (PRR)1  since the country’s accession to the EU in 2004 (Batory, 2016; Pytlas, 
2018).  From 2010, the party has governed Hungary with a two-third majority under the leadership of 
Viktor Orban and systematically dismantled linchpins of democracy, the rule of law and political 
pluralism in Hungary. They have done so without receiving sanction from the EPP until September 
2018, when the conservative MEPs backed triggering procedures that could lead to sanctions under 
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). By contrast, the EPP bolstered a confrontational 
stance towards Poland’s PiS—another PRR party heading a backsliding democratic state since 2015—
voting in favour of proceedings Article 7 proceedings as soon as January 2018, three short years after 
PiS took power. 
The central explanation for the EPP’s accommodative attitude towards Fidesz has been one of 
EPG strategic interests: simply, Fidesz is a member of the EPP, and therefore the EPP as a group has 
been accommodative to maintain Hungarian seats within its ranks; meanwhile, PiS is not a member and 
therefore the EPP can afford to be more confrontational in this case (Kelemen, 2017; Müller, 2015). 
Because of the dominant position of the EPP in the EP (274 seats in 2009-2014 and 221 in 2014-2019), 
as well as their dominant position in the European Commission, this strategic EPG hypothesis has also 
been used to explain the main reason why EU action under Article 7 against the Fidesz government has 
been stalled since 2010 (Sedelmeier, 2017). In other words, the relative clout of the EPP across 
European institutions has served as a powerful bulwark in protecting Fidesz against sanction for its 
‘misdeeds’—a bulwark largely unavailable to PiS. In addition to this strategic explanation of the EPP’s 
accommodative stance, attention has also been drawn to constructivist factors pertaining to attitudes 
towards fundamental values and European integration that may be influencing individual MEPs in their 
voting behaviour (Sedelmeir 2014, 2017; Meijers & Van der Veer 2019).  
                                               
1 Following Cas Mudde, we understand radical right populism as combining the core principles of nativist 
nationalism and right-wing authoritarianism, with a thin-centred ideology of populism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 11-31). 
This later discourse opposes the morally virtuous people to the corrupt elite and puts a particular emphasis on 





We find the evidence suggesting a combination of strategic and constructivist explanations 
compelling. They tell the beginning of a story, which we hope to deepen. We aim to do so with the help 
of a data set assembling the votes of 274 EPP MEPs in 2009-2014 and 221 in 2014-2019 on a total of 
24 resolutions that address violations of fundamental values by Member States since Hungary became 
a “problem case” in 2010 (see Appendix 1 for the full list). Unlike previous studies, which have analysed 
a small number of votes focusing on sanctions towards Poland and Hungary to explore their hypotheses, 
our data set gives a more comprehensive picture of EPP MEP voting behaviour on fundamental values, 
including a wider range of data points to explore possible changes in voting behaviour over time.  
We develop three lines of inquiry. First, we ask to what extent have EPP MEP’s been cohesive 
in their response to rule of law related offenses? Although it has been acknowledged that not everyone 
toes the party line within the EPP on questions of fundamental values, this phenomenon and its potential 
significance for understanding the EPPs voting behaviour on these issues has not been sufficiently 
explored. We precisely identify the cohesion of EPP MEPs on votes pertaining to fundamental values, 
demonstrating that this cohesion is far lower than average voting cohesion across issues. Second, we 
ask to what extent has the EPG’s response to fundamental values violations evolved over time? This 
phenomenon is yet to be studied in detail. We find that, over time, EPP MEPs are increasingly likely to 
vote in favour of resolutions that address fundamental values infringements. Taken together, the 
relatively low levels of cohesion and the fact that cohesion has been decreasing over time suggests that 
the strategic interests of the EPP may not have quite as much explanatory weight as previously stated. 
Third, we test this by asking what determines the extent to which individual EPP MEPs favour action 
against the abuse of fundamental values? As with previous studies, we explore both strategic and 
constructivist variables. In the first instance, we explore the standard strategic hypothesis concerning 
the extent to which EPP party membership determines voting behaviour. However, we also test another 
set of strategic variables that have been less investigated. Specifically, we attempt to determine the 
degree to which the strategic interests of national parties to which MEPs belong could play a role in 
influencing their voting behaviour. In the second instance, we test standard constructivist variables such 
as GAL/TAN ideology and Euroscepticism.  Uniquely, we attempt to understand whether these strategic 
and constructivist factors can explain intra-party variation within the EPP, rather than just inter-party 
variation between the EPP and other EPGs, which has been the focus of previous studies.  
Our analysis corroborates the dominant narrative that EPP strategic interests play a central role 
in determining EPP MEP voting behaviour on fundamental values. However, our paper also accounts 
for phenomena that the EPG strategic hypothesis cannot fully explain. Most importantly, this includes 
the unusually high levels of intra-EPP dissent, and the increase in this dissent over time, which we find 
on EP votes on fundamental values. By bringing in the role of national-party strategic interests and 
further exploring a range of constructivist variables, we go a long way towards explaining these 
phenomena. Overall, our paper achieves a better appreciation of the ways in which party politics can 





The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the context in which the 
EPP emerges as an intriguing player in the debate on fundamental values in the EU. In doing this, we 
highlight what the literature tells us so far about the voting behaviour of MEPs on rule of law related 
issues, and which blind spots still remain. Second, we provide a first analysis of the positions of EPP 
MEPs on our sampled resolutions, focusing on their degree of cohesiveness and evolution over time. 
Third, we develop a series of hypotheses to explain our preliminary empirical findings, based on what 
we know of MEP voting behaviour and centre-right strategies towards PRR parties from the existing 
literatures. Fourth we test these hypotheses, presenting our methods, model and findings. We conclude 
by discussing what these results add to our understanding of contemporary obstacles to EU sanctions 
again backsliding Member States.  
  
 
 The EU politics of fundamental values: A complex affair 
 
 The partisan foundations of EU inaction 
Many detailed institutional reports and academic accounts have convincingly demonstrated that serious 
breaches of EU fundamental values have occurred in Hungary and Poland under the stewardship of 
Fidesz and PiS respectively (Bogaards, 2018; Dawson & Hanley, 2016; Freedom House, 2019; 
Kelemen, 2016; Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013; Przybylski, 2018; Sitter & Bakke, 2019). Yet 
the EU has been so far been ineffective in addressing the problem  (Kochenov et al., 2016). The primary 
available mechanisms are outlined in Article 7.1, 7.2. and 7.3 TEU, allowing for the EU to issue an 
official warning to offending Member States (Article 7.1) and ultimately to suspend its voting rights if 
these fail to comply (Article 7.2 and 7.3). It took the European Parliament, with the support of the 
majority of the EPP, eight years after Fidesz obtained its two-thirds domestic majority in 2010 to trigger 
the first steps of this procedure. Starting in 2015, Polish backsliding on fundamental values has been 
both less aggressive and taken place over a shorter period of time than in Hungary. Nevertheless, the 
European Parliament was willing to vote against PiS to support the Commission in its triggering of 
Article 7.1 against Poland in March 2018 (2018/2541(RSP)).  
Scholarship has focused on the legal and institutional reasons for the EU’s relative incapacity 
to protect its normative integrity in this rule of law crisis (Müller, 2015; Pech & Scheppele, 2017; 
Scheppele, 2013; Sedelmeier, 2017). Crucially, Article 7 is the main legal vehicle with which to 
sanction states guilty of violating fundamental values, yet Article 7.2 and 7.3 require the unanimous 
support of all other Member States. Furthermore, any new legal mechanisms with real sanctioning 
power are unlikely without some kind of Treaty revision, which also faces an unanimity hurdle.  
Beyond these procedural shortcomings, there are distinctly political reasons for the EU’s lack 
and inconsistency of action against fundamental values offenders. After all, the warning mechanism of 





Council acting by a majority of four fifths rather than by unanimity. Yet not only did the EP take eight 
years to begin to push back against Hungary with a vote to trigger Article 7 in 2018, but two years later, 
the Council still proves unwilling to cast a vote on the Parliament’s symbolic recommendation. This 
incapacity of EU institutions to use the little latitude which the Treaties do provide points to alternative 
motives of inaction than simply a “lack of options”.  
A small literature has so far considered the political foundations of the impasse on fundamental 
values violation, with a particular focus on the role of the EP. Sedelmeir (2014, 2017) and Meijers & 
Van der Veer (2019) especially have analysed the determinants of MEPs inclination towards sanctions 
against offending states. Focusing on a small number of votes related to fundamental values violations 
in specific Member States, they test both rational institutionalist hypotheses relating to the strategic 
interests of European Party Groups, and constructivist ones related to MEP’s normative commitment to 
the rule of law and European integration. These studies show that a number of individual factors 
contribute to frustrating sanctions, including ideological proximity with incriminated states, 
unfavourable views of European integration, and pre-existing alliances with targeted parties in 
European Party Groups. Being a member of the same EPG, especially, will make an MEP less likely to 
take a confrontational stance in cases of rule of law backsliding.  
Partisan support for incriminated states has therefore emerged as a key determinant of EU 
inaction. The role of the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) as a veto player is especially 
relevant here. As the largest parliamentary group in the past two legislatures, the EPP bears a heavy 
responsibility in staling action in the EP against the Hungarian Fidesz, an EPP member. The EPP 
majority voted against 6 out of the 7 EP resolutions and own-initiative procedures adopted on the 
Hungarian situation since 2011. On the other hand, it allowed action against PiS, a European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) member, supporting 3 out of the 4 related resolutions taken by the 
EP. The ECR – a small EPG—could afford PiS little protection from unfavourable votes, while the 
EPP’s sheer size give it substantial clout to protect its member parties, such as Fidesz, from 
unfavourable votes (Kelemen 2017).  
While the EPP’s role in the EU’s crisis of fundamental values is widely recognised, few studies 
focus specifically on the reasons motivating this obstructive behaviour. The EPP’s leniency towards 
Fidesz is widely assumed to stem from strategic self-interest: the EPG has taken a soft stance on 
Hungary’s offenses because it prioritises maintaining the support of Fidesz as a member party (with 14 
seats in 2009-2014 and 12 in 2014-2019) over the protection of EU fundamental values (Kelemen, 
2017; Müller, 2015; Sedelmeier, 2014). Daniel R. Kelemen (2017, 226) states the point succinctly: 
“Orbán’s Fidesz party delivers MEPs to the EPP bloc in the European Parliament, and in exchange for 
his ongoing participation in their party group, they turn a blind eye to his misdeeds”. Pech and Scheppele 
deploy a very similar narrative: “losing Fidesz MEPs, who have been loyal members of the EPP when 
it comes to voting, would undermine the EPP’s primacy within the Parliament and its ability to appoint 





with the British Conservative party leaving in 2009, keeping Fidesz on board as a member might have 
been particularly important to further the EPP’s “policy-seeking” and “office-seeking” goals (Strom, 
1990).  
 
The EPP’s position: More than meets the eye 
This strategic hypothesis is compelling, but it tends to minimize two key dimensions of the EPP’s 
position on fundamental values violations. First, there is some empirical evidence that the conservative 
EPG is in fact strongly divided on these issues. This point is often acknowledged in passing. Kelemen, 
for instance, recognises the existence of dissenting figures, such as Viviane Redding or Jose Manuel 
Barroso (Kelemen, 2017, p. 225; Kirchick, 2013). Meijers and van der Veer (2019: 14) also highlight 
that in the two Hungary-focused resolutions they analyse “approximately 30 per cent of MEPs from the 
EPP condemned (the Hungarian) situation (…), indicating important divisions within the party group”. 
Pech and Scheppele (2017: 32) similarly note that “at least half of the EPP members split from the 
party’s official position and allowed the Tavares Report to pass in July 2013”). However, none of these 
studies expand on the evidence of these divisions, nor do they present the dissent as important for 
understanding the complex motivations of EPP MEP’s.  
Second, and relatedly, the evolution of the EPP’s position over time also tends to be overlooked. 
The majority of conservative MEPs switched to supporting the activation of Article 7 against Hungary 
in September 2018, with 115 in favour, 56 against and 28 abstaining (2017/2131(INL), thus lifting the 
EPP’s effective veto on EU action. This was followed by a decision of the EPP Political Assembly in 
March 2019 to suspend Fidesz’s EPP membership. In September 2020, the EPP also joined forces with 
other EPGs to demand from the Council a more robust proposal to condition EU funds on respect for 
the rule of law by Member States (European Parliament, 2020). By tending to treat the EPP as a 
monolithic bloc and assuming self-interest as its driving force, the current literature fails to adequately 
explore the role that other factors may play in structuring the position of individual EPP MEP’s on 
fundamental values issues and its evolution over time. 
 In this paper we explore this evidence further, and in this process nuance and add robustness to 
current understandings of the EPP’s position. We study the votes of 274 EPP MEPs in 2009-2014 and 
221 EPP on 24 resolutions pertaining to respect for democratic standards, the rule of law and human 
rights by Member States. The paper addresses three key research questions: First, to what extent have 
EPP MEP’s been cohesive in their response to rule of law related offenses? Second, to what extent has 
the EPG’s response to rule of law offenses evolved over time? And third, what determines the extent to 
which individual EPP MEPs favour stronger action against democratic abuse?  
Our paper builds on existing studies in several ways. First, instead of focusing solely on the 
few resolutions that have targeted Hungary or Poland, we situate the stance of EPP MEPs on these 
critical cases in a wider context, studying the EPP’s legislative politics in matters pertaining to 





initiative procedures that broadly concern the respect for fundamental values within the EU.2 We 
identified these by conducting an extensive search into the European Parliament legislative database 
using the words “Democracy”, “Rule of Law” and “Human Rights”. We solely selected resolutions that 
address fundamental values and their violation within EU Member States, thereby excluding resolution 
on third countries or on respect for democratic standards by and within EU institutions. 15 of these 
resolutions target violations in specific Member States, and 6 out of these 15 instruct the EP itself, or 
other EU institutions, to take concrete steps towards advancing the Article 7 procedure. By studying 
EPP MEP votes on 24 of these resolutions, for which roll-call data was available on VoteWatch or the 
European Parliament website,3 we are in a unique position to understand the stance of conservative 
MEPs towards Hungary in light of the party group’s wider fundamental values politics over the past 
decade.  
Secondly, this larger sample allows us to explore the temporal dimension of the EPP’s stance, 
and whether its changing position on Hungary is part of a larger shift in the EPP’s politics on 
fundamental values. Our sample considers decisions related to fundamental values taken by the EP 
since the Hungarian Media law of July 22nd 2010, which triggered attention to fundamental values 
breaches in Hungary and motivated the Parliament’s first resolution on the Hungarian case in March 
2011 (2011/2510(RSP)) (Brouillette, van Beek, & Dencik, 2011, p. 1). As detailed in our methods 
section below, we model our data in the form of a conditional risk set model in order to account for the 
factors that increase likelihood of EPP MEPs voting in favour of these resolutions, thereby adding to 
the negative binomial regression models applied by Meijers and van der Veer (2019).  
Third, in drawing attention to the issue of party fragmentation and focusing on 24 resolutions, 
we are able to explore the relevance of a larger number of factors than previous studies. We verify 
whether the factors explaining inter-party variance in EP votes that sanction Hungary or Poland—for 
example GAL/TAN attitudes or party Euroscepticism—hold for explaining intra-EPP variance as well. 
We also test a number of additional hypotheses derived from the wider literature on EP competition and 
the scholarship on the accommodation of PRR parties by centrist forces, hypotheses that have until now 
been side-lined by the literature on fundamental values politics in the EP. This allows us to complexify 





                                               
2 See Appendix 1 for a list of all 28 resolutions.  
3 A total of 28 resolutions voted between 2011 and 2019 fit our criteria, but MEPs did not request roll-calls for 
four out of these. The 24 resolutions analysed here thus represent the entire population of resolutions we are 
interested in, at the exclusion of the four resolutions with missing roll-call votes. Interestingly, three out of these 






Understanding the position of EPP MEPs on fundamental values 
 
 The cohesion and evolution of EPP votes 
To answer our first two questions on the cohesion and evolution of EPP votes on fundamental values, 
we construct an original dataset containing roll-call data of the 24 resolutions described above, obtained 
from VoteWatch. In cases in which the votes were not available, we contacted the EP directly. We 
operationalize our dependent variable in a binary way: it takes the value of 0 if an EPP MEP votes 
against the resolution and 1 if they vote in favour. We exclude abstentions, that is, MEPs who did not 
vote or were absent.4 Data on the party line – operationalized as the plurality vote choice of the whole 
EPP group – and  the party group affiliation of the rapporteur are both retrieved from VoteWatch.  
Studies of EP votes on the Hungarian situation acknowledge significant divisions among EPP 
MEPs (Kelemen, 2017, p. 225; Kirchick, 2013; Meijers & Van der Veer, 2019b, p. 14; Pech & 
Scheppele, 2017, p. 32). Our first empirical step is to explicitly explore the nature and relevance of 
party cohesion in the EPP on Hungary and fundamental values votes more generally. According to 
Shaun Bowler and Gail McElroy (2015), intra-party dissensus tends to be greatest when there is inter-
party disagreement between the largest parties on a given vote. As such, given the high disparity in 
voting patterns between the EPP and the Progressive Alliance of Socials and Democrats on issues 
pertaining to backsliding in Member States, we can also expect high levels of intra-party disagreement 
on these resolutions.  
To verify this assumption, we use vote cohesion data collected by VoteWatch.eu, which 
calculates cohesion scores for each individual vote using the ‘Agreement Index’ following the Hix-
Noury-Roland formula—the EPG cohesion rate is then the average of the scores of the Agreement 
Index.5 In Figure 1a, we compare the average cohesion score of the EPP across the 7th and 8th term of 
the EP (full black line); the average cohesion score for votes in the policy field of Justice and Civil 
Liberties for the same period (dotted black line); the average cohesion score for the 24 rule of law-
related resolutions under study (dashed line); and the average cohesion score for the four votes in our 
sample about Hungary (dashed-and-dotted line).6  
Our data shows that intra-EPG dissensions on these issues are particularly high. There is 
significantly less cohesion on these issues within the EPP than on most other EP policies. As shown in 
Figure 1a, in the period 2009-2019 EPP average party cohesion on these votes (67.3%) is considerably 
weaker than the overall average cohesion of EPP votes in the same period (92.5%), and also far lower 
than for votes originating in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee (92.03%). The 
                                               
4 In excluding abstentions, we follow the approach of Meijers and Van der Veer (2019). A potential problem 
with including abstentions would be that it is not clear what the motivation of MEPs is to abstain. 
5 The ‘Agreement Index’ according to the Hix-Noury-Roland formula is: Ai=(max(Y,N,A)-(0.5((Y+N+A)-
max(Y,N,A))))/(Y+N+A), where Y = number of votes “FOR”, N = number of votes “AGAINST”, and A = 
number of “ABSTENTIONS” 





average cohesion for votes on the Hungarian situation is even lower, at 59%. Figure 1b shows the fitted 
trend line for all resolutions in the study and the resolutions relating to Hungary. While there is a 
downward trend (i.e. a decrease in cohesion over time) for the votes relating to Hungary, this is not the 




Figure 1a. Cohesion score of the resolutions in the analysis.  
Diamonds in red indicate resolutions to Hungary. Circles in blue indicate resolutions not 
relating to Hungary. The solid line signifies the average cohesion score of all EPP votes in the 
period studies, the average cohesion score of all resolutions relating to civil liberty. The dashed 
line shows the average cohesion score of all resolution in the study, the ‘dashed-and-dotted’ 























Figure 1b. Trends of cohesion scores in the analysis.  
Diamonds indicate resolutions to Hungary, circles resolutions not relating to Hungary. The 
solid line indicates the fitted trend line for resolutions not relating to Hungary, the dashed line 
shows the fitted trend line relating to Hungary.   
 
We now turn to the evolution of EPP MEP votes over time. As emphasised above, the party’s 
position on sanctions towards Hungary has evolved in the past decade, from supporting Fidesz in the 
term 2010-2014 to adopting a more critical position from 2018 onwards. We aim to verify whether this 
corresponds to a wider shift of EPP MEP positions on fundamental values issues or corresponds to an 
isolated response towards a particular country. To test this question empirically, we rely on the 
descriptive data in Figure 2. The figure shows that there has been indeed a wider shift of EPP MEP 
positions on issues relating to fundamental values, with a positive evolution on votes of this kind as a 
whole in the second half of the 2014-2018 term especially. This seems to indicate that EPP MEPs 
become more likely to vote in favour of resolutions as time progresses. As a robustness check, we fit a 
fixed-effects logistic model with dummy variables for the year a resolution was voted on. The 
coefficients for the yearly dummies are generally positive and increase in size. This indicates that the 
likelihood of voting in favour of one of the resolutions increases from year to year, and thus that there 
is an increase in the propensity to vote for a resolution over time (see Appendix 3). Patterns over time 
by member state can be found in Appendix 6. As discussed further in the conclusion, a noticeable drop 
in votes in favour of resolutions seems to occur in 2015 for all EPP MEP, a period during which a large 


























Figure 2: Share of votes in favour for the whole EPP group per resolution, smoothed 
 
 
 Hypotheses for intra-EPP disagreement on fundamental values votes  
  
Having established the high levels of intra-EPP division on issues relating to the EU’s normative 
integrity, we now outline several hypotheses that could help to explain this phenomenon. In line with 
existing literature studying fundamental values  votes in the EP, we posit that there are both strategic 
and constructivist reasons for EPP MEPs either opposing or supporting EU intervention. We test a 
number of variables that studies have suggested influence the voting behaviour of MEPs on these 
debates. However, we also consider a number of hypotheses derived from other relevant literatures, 
which have not yet been applied to this specific question. 
 
Strategic motives related to EU politics 
 
First of all, using our larger sample of resolutions, we follow previous studies in testing the EPG 

























voting behaviour when a member of the EPG is targeted. In line with the expectations of this literature, 
we hypothesise:  
 
Hypothesis 1: EPP MEPs are less likely to vote in favour of a resolution that targets one of its members 
as opposed to resolutions that do not.  
 
From what we know of the literature on competition in the EP, however, the strategic interests 
of the EPG are not all that count when it comes to understanding the voting behaviour of MEPs more 
generally. Previous studies on fundamental values votes in the EP have neglected to explicitly explore 
the potential role that the strategic interests of national parties on the European level may play in 
influencing the voting behaviour of their MEPs. The literature on competition in the EP teaches us that 
party loyalty is complex in the EU precisely because MEPs have two main principals: their EPG and 
their national party (Hix, 2002). Even though EPG membership can only explain 15% of variance in 
individual MEP attitudes to policy issues (with nationality and ideological preferences on the left-right 
scale accounting for the rest), it is striking that voting cohesion across EPGs hovers around 85 per cent 
(Willumsen 2018) to 90 per cent  (Corbett et al., 2011). A number of factors can be cited to explain this 
phenomenon, such as the fact that EPGs control the career trajectories of MEPs within the EP and so 
have a material carrot and stick with which to exert party discipline.  
However, the literature also suggests that national parties can have an important impact on 
voting behaviour, both in terms of encouraging MEPs to defect from or stay true to the EPG party line 
(Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). Specifically, MEPs tend to be more responsive to instructions by their 
national party when the national party is in government and therefore a member of the European Council 
and Council (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2006; Willumsen, 2018). A major reason for this, at least when it 
comes to the Council (Willumsen, 2018), appears to be the fact that MEPs are co-legislators with the 
Council. As such, when agreement is reached in the Council on legislation that favours or disfavours 
the interests of a particular national party, the relevant minister is likely to exert more pressure on the 
voting intentions of MEPs belonging to the same national party in order to get the legislation through, 
or to block it, as the case may be.  
There are good reasons to expect that governments with a seat at the Council will instruct 
affiliated MEPs to oppose EU intervention when it comes to fundamental values issues. It has been long 
recognised that, given the high consensus hurdles within the Council and the European Council, an 
atmosphere of deliberation (or at least collegial bargaining) is required if individual states are to build 
coalitions of mutual interest to advance their respective goals and in order for these institutions as a 
whole to come to effective conclusions (Puetter, 2012; Warntjen, 2010). This is especially pertinent as 
both institutions have taken on greater responsibilities since 2008 in managing responses to the Euro-
crisis, refugee crisis and COVID-19 crisis. On this basis, it is reasonable to argue that national parties 





alienate other national governments within the EU by, for example, pursuing sanctions or open criticism 
of backsliding states. We thereby hypothesise the following:  
 
Hypothesis 2: EPP MEPs from a national party in government at the time of the vote are less likely to 
vote in favour of a resolution than EPP MEPs from a national party in opposition at the time of the 
vote.  
The rationale behind this hypothesis provokes two further reflections on other potentially 
salient strategic motives of national parties at the European level. We posit that there are two further 
variables that may be relevant to our present study.  
First, EPP MEPs whose national parties are in Member States that have substantial interests in 
common at the European level may feel the need to support any state that is directly or indirectly 
targeted by a resolution. The Visegrad group composed of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic have been in a strategic coalition at the European level since they each joined the EU in 2004. 
Their long-standing military, economic and cultural cooperation has even spilled over to questions of 
fundamental values with a common rejection of ‘humanitarian universalism’ in relation to the treatment 
of refugees (Vachudova 2020: 333). It is therefore worth investigating whether MEPs from these four 
states are any more likely than other MEPs to vote against fundamental values.  Since three of the four 
– Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – have each been the target of at least one EP resolution on fundamental 
values, it is likely that their resistance to votes of this kind will be heightened still further. We 
hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: EPP MEPs who are members of Visegrad national parties are less likely to vote in favour 
of a resolution than EPP MEPs from other national parties. 
Second, and more generally, MEPs belonging to national parties in Member States that have 
reason to expect that they may become the target of resolutions in the future may be less likely to vote 
in favour of a resolution. They may seek to resist EU interference in domestic politics and to display 
solidarity with targeted states with the expectation of reciprocity in the future. States that are most likely 
to be concerned about being the target of an EP resolution on fundamental values are those that display 
lower levels of respect for the rule of law and human rights. In light of these considerations, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 4: EPP MEPs from countries with lower institutional performance on democratic indicators 
are less likely to vote in favour of a resolution than EPP MEPs from countries with higher institutional 
performance on democratic indicators.  
 
It should be noted that neither Hypothesis 4 nor 5 depend on an MEPs national party being in 





belonging to national parties in opposition domestically may still have incentives to display solidarity 
with members of the group on fundamental values resolutions. In the case of poor domestic performance 
on democratic indicators, it is not obviously the case that national opposition parties would seek to 
encourage an interventionist approach from the EU, especially if the opposition may one day be faced 
with such recrimination when itself in power at a later date.   
 
Strategic motives related to domestic politics 
 
National parties influencing EPP MEPs may not be motivated solely by strategic interests at the 
European level. Domestic strategic interests may also play a role, with centre-right parties attempting 
to escape criticism from their PRR counterparts for promoting EU interventionism. From the literature 
on mainstream party strategies towards the PRR, for example, we know that accommodation of the 
PRR has been the dominant response of the centre-right in domestic electoral contexts. In a bid to limit 
the electoral success of these opponents, the large majority of centre-right parties in Europe have 
themselves shifted to the right over time (Bale, 2003; Herman & Muldoon, 2018; Meguid, 2005).7 There 
are many good reason, however, to doubt that this logic also applies to EP politics. Given the limited 
politicisation of EP politics, there is little evidence so far that MEPs have felt the need to accommodate 
PRR parties at the EU level (McDonnell & Werner, 2019; Meijers & van der Veer, 2019a). Furthermore, 
to the extent that Eurosceptical voters care most about issues such as immigration and unemployment 
(De Vries, 2018, p. 117), it may be considered very unlikely that backsliding on fundamental values 
would be a sufficiently prominent issue for national parties to put pressure on their MEPs.  
These caveats notwithstanding, voting against sanctions might still be the safest option for a 
vote-seeking centrist party faced with strong competition from PRR forces. While the details of EP 
politics might not matter to citizens, right-wing Eurosceptics have nevertheless increasingly been able 
to mobilize citizens by denouncing overreach of the EU’s powers into issues that rightfully belong to 
the realm of national sovereignty. Any party associated with supporting novel forms of EU 
interventionism into how a Member States governs itself—especially given the Eurosceptical emphasis 
on the EU’s own purportedly weak democratic credentials–is liable to come under inflammatory 
criticism by the PRR. It is, therefore, still worth investigating whether the following hypothesis holds:  
 
Hypothesis 5: EPP MEPs from national parties facing higher levels of electoral competition from PRR 
parties are less likely to vote in favour of a resolution than EPP MEPs from national parties facing 
lower levels of electoral competition from PRR parties. 
                                               
7 This has included increasingly more restrictive immigration, integration and law and order policies (Carvalho, 
2014; van Spanje, 2010), the adoption of more Eurosceptic positions in some countries (Alexandre-Collier, 2018), 
a greater propensity to form electoral alliance with the PRR (de Lange, 2012) and a more general radicalization 





Constructivist motives: ideology 
 
Finally, ideological positioning is a plausible reason for EPP MEPs either opposing or supporting 
resolutions on fundamental values. We know that ideology plays a key role in MEP vote choice. 
According to an MEP survey, 45 per cent of variance in MEP policy positions can be explained by 
distinct ideological preferences (Scully, Hix, & Farrell, 2012 p. 678). Existing studies of MEP voting 
on resolutions concerning fundamental values indicate that cultural conservatism as well as 
Euroscepticism explain inter-party variance on these issues (Meijers and Van Der Veer 2019; Sedelmeir 
2014, 2017). We hypothesise that these two key dimensions of ideological preference also play a part 
in explaining intra-party variance in steering EPP MEPs position on these issues. The reasoning for 
both expectations is as follows. In the first instance, EPP MEPs who endorse more conservative 
positions on cultural and identity-related issues are also more likely to identify with backsliding states 
ideologically and therefore favour an accommodative position towards them. In the second case, the 
common Eurosceptical suspicion of overreaching European competences alluded to above may be 
enough to dissuade MEPs from supporting EU actions on domestic politics. Plausibly, as Sedelmeier 
(2014 p.110) suggests, Eurosceptical representatives may hold this latter view even if they are 
ideologically bent against backsliding on fundamental values. We thus formulate the following two 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 6: EPP MEPs from national parties with more Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) 
ideological preferences are less likely to vote in favour of a resolution than EPP MEPs with more 
Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) ideological preferences.  
 
Hypothesis 7: EPP MEPs from more Eurosceptic national parties are less likely to vote in favour of a 





Data and operationalization  
To answer our third research question on the reasons for intra-EPP disagreement on fundamental values, 
we operationalize our independent variables as follows.8 In order to test Hypothesis 1 relating to the 
defence of the EPP’s strategic interests, we include a dummy variable capturing whether the resolution 
directly targets an EPP member. In our sample, this only includes resolutions focusing on Hungary.  
                                               
8 For an account of how we operationalise our dependent variable see page 7. Descriptive statistics for our 





The next three hypotheses relate to the strategic defence of the national party interest at the 
European level. For Hypothesis 2, we include a variable which takes the value of 0 if a national party 
group is in opposition at the national level at the time of the vote and 1 if it is in government. To test 
Hypothesis 3, we include a dummy for whether an EPP MEP comes from a V4 country. For Hypothesis 
4, we rely on the V-Dem dataset to operationalize the state of democracy in each Member State 
(Coppedge et al., 2019). In particular, we rely on the ‘Liberal Democracy’ aggregated index, which is 
a continuous variable ranging between 0 for low levels of liberal democracy and 1 for high levels, based 
on expert placements.9  
For Hypothesis 5 concerning national party strategic interests at the domestic level, we 
operationalize the electoral vulnerability of the EPP member party from PRRs as the vote share of the 
EPP member party minus the vote share of far-right competitors in the most recent national election. 
Higher (positive) values thus indicate a larger advantage of a EPP member party over its PRR 
competitor(s). The variable is labelled ‘EPP Advantage’. We use data from the Parlgov database 
(Döring & Manow, 2019) and rely on the “PopuList” for the classification as parties belonging to the 
radical right (Rooduijn et al., 2019) 
Finally, we test two independent ideological variables, for which we make use of the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). For each MEP we include their national party’s value on the 
GAL/TAN or ‘cultural’ left/right scale (H6), and we also use a measure of the position of the parties on 
European integration from the same dataset (H7). We operationalize the GAL/TAN position of a party 
as a dummy, which takes the value of 0 if a party’s position is smaller or equal to the mean value of 6.5 




As discussed above in relation to Figure 2, the descriptive evidence shows that the share of MEPs voting 
in favour of a resolution broadly increases over time. In order to model this data structure adequately 
and to answer the substantive question of interest as closely as possible, we fit a an ‘elapsed time’ 
conditional risk set model, in which the risk of voting for a resolution increases with time elapsed from 
the beginning of the period in which they are at risk (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). This model 
is a variation of the event history model or Cox-regression, which operationalizes the likelihood of an 
event occurring or an observation transferring to a different state as a function of elapsed time over a 
set of covariates.11 We are focusing specifically on the time elapsed since 21 July 2011, as this day 
                                               
9 The “Lidem” index combines information on electoral democracy or “polyarchy” (electoral institutions, freedom 
of elections and freedom of the media) with a liberal component (capturing civil rights, independence of the 
judiciary and checks and balances).  
10 In appendix 4, we run the model with a continuous Gal-Tan variable.  
11 A similar approach has been used to model the likelihood of vote switching on controversial issues in the US 





marks the date on which the first controversial “Media Authority” Law (Act 82/100) was passed by the 
Hungarian Parliament. Arguably, from this day onwards MEPs were at least implicitly under pressure 
to condemn fundamental values breaches. Modelling the data in this way, we are able to assess the 
individual determinants of EPP MEP voting any given point in time, and thus the factors that make it 
more likely that they "switch" their vote from a negative to a positive one over time. 
 In table 1 below, we fit 4 different models: Model 1 contains the resolution-related variable 
(H1) and other variables relating to the interests of the national parties at the EU level (H2, H3, H4). 
Model 2 adds the variable relating to the vote-seeking goals of national parties at the domestic level, 
namely the difference between the vote share of the EPP member parties and their right-wing 
competitors (H5).  Model 3 contains the first set of variables relating to the resolutions and the EU level 
interest of national parties (those in Model 1), as well as the ideological factors, specifically the 
GAL/TAN and EU-position of the national party group (H6 and H7). Model 4 is the full model, 
containing all variables. In Appendix 2, we include all four models excluding the votes by Fidesz EPP 
MEPs, but our results do not seem to be sensitive to this exclusion.  
 
Findings  
We now turn to the results of our regression analysis, displayed in Table 1. The results of the 
conditional risk set model are displayed as hazard ratios, indicating the increase in the “risk” of voting 
for a resolution associated with a change in the respective variable. Values below 1 indicated a lower 
risk of voting in favour of a resolution, and values above 1 a higher risk. The results confirm that EPP 
MEPs are significantly more likely to vote against a resolution if it targets an EPP member, here Fidesz. 
These results confirm H1, and therefore lends further credence to the “strategic EPG hypothesis” 
according to which EPP votes on rule of law violations can be explained by their willingness to protect 
members of their EPG against sanctions.  Throughout the models, EPP MEPs are around 20% less likely 
to vote for a resolution if it targets Hungary, demonstrating a strong unwillingness to ‘call out’ a member 
party.  
The regression analysis confirms that EPP MEPs with national parties in government (H2) are 
less likely to vote in favour of resolutions. Parties in government are approximately 20% less at risk to 
vote for a resolution, as indicated by the hazard ratios. Thus, out of every five resolutions opposition 
parties vote in favour of, government parties vote against one. A glance at the data shows important 
disparities in the position of MEPs from different Member States (Figure 3). As Figure 3 shows, there 
is significant variation between countries with regard to the extent to which EPP MEPs on average vote 
for a resolution. Indeed, MEPs from the V4 countries seem to be less likely to vote in favour of the 
resolutions, lending conditional support to Hypothesis 3. In the full model (model 4) the V4 variable is 
significant at the 0.01 level. MEPs from the V4 countries are thus approximately 27% less likely to vote 
for a resolution. We also find an effect for the quality of democracy in the MEP’s home countries (H4). 





respective country voting in favour of a resolution by a factor of four. With H2, H3 and H4 confirmed, 
it appears that EPP MEPs indeed have other, strategic reasons to support backsliding states pertaining 
to the status of their national party in the EU. 
 
Figure 3: Average share of votes in favour for all resolutions, by nationality of EPP MEPs 
 
 The national electoral context seems to have only a minor effect. The closeness of the domestic 
electoral competition between the EPP member party and its far-right competitors is significant in the 
full model, but its substantive effect is negative (thus not in the expected direction)and very small. We 
therefore find no evidence for H5. However, we find clear support for both of our ideological 
hypotheses, H6 and H7. As expected, the more authoritarian/traditionalist an MEPs party is, the less 
likely they are to vote in favour of a resolution, lending support for H7. Substantively, parties with an 
authoritarian position on the GAL-TAN scale are around 30% less likely to vote for a resolution than 
parties with liberal values.  Finally, we find a strong positive effect for the EU position of the domestic 
party, whereby EPP MEPs from less Eurosceptic parties are more supportive of the resolutions under 
study. A unit increase in party support for the EU is associated with an increase of around 25% in the 
likelihood of voting for a resolution. These findings are consistent with previous studies, confirming 
that constructivist factors have an important role to play in predicting EPP MEPs voting behaviour on 








 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Government 0.82*** 0.85** 0.76*** 0.80*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
V4 0.87 0.76* 0.90 0.73*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Hungary 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 




3.89*** 2.83** 5.17*** 3.73*** 
 (1.63) (1.22) (1.75) (1.31) 
EPP Advantage  1.00*  0.99*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
EU Position   1.23*** 1.25*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
GAL-TAN   0.70*** 0.70*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 4084 4058 4014 3989 
 
Table 1: Results of the conditional risk set model.  
Hazard Ratios; Standard errors in parentheses* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have sought to investigate three questions. First, we attempted to understand the nature 
of cohesion within the EPP on votes relating to fundamental values. We found that compared to the 
average overall vote cohesion within the EPP–and indeed the vote cohesion on issues pertaining to the 
policy field of Justice and Civil Liberties–the EPP was far more divided on resolutions concerning 
fundamental values. Second, with our longitudinal dataset, we were able to explore how the position of 
EPP MEPs evolved over time on questions of fundamental values. We found that on resolutions targeted 
at Hungary, and indeed all other resolutions on fundamental values, EPP MEPs became more likely 
over time to vote in favour of sanctions. These findings in pursuit of our first two questions problematise 
the tendency to treat the EPP as a monolithic voting bloc, driven primarily by its own strategic interests. 
If questions of fundamental values are polarising for the EPP, and if the EPP has gradually shifted from 
an accommodative to a confrontational stance over time on issues of this kind, then it is necessary to 
consider all possible variables that may explain the original discord and its development over time. This 
was the nature of our third research question, namely to investigate the determinants of individual voting 
behaviour on fundamental values within the EPP. Building on existing literature analysing inter-party 
voting behaviour differences on fundamental values in the EP, as well as literature pertaining to political 





familiar and novel hypotheses to attempt to understand the drivers of intra-party voting variation within 
the EPP on questions of fundamental values. These hypotheses covered strategic and constructivist 
variables.  
 On the strategic side, we verified one of the key findings in the literature on EPG voting 
behaviour on fundamental values: the EPP has protected Fidesz in order to safeguard Hungarian votes 
in its ranks, and thus the strategic, office and policy-seeking interests of the conservative EPG. Our 
findings also reinforce what we already know about voting behaviour in the European Parliament more 
generally: MEPs have two main principals and look out for the strategic interests of both their EPG and 
their national party. The fact that MEPs are more likely to oppose sanctions when their party is in 
government at the national level suggests they are willing to protect the capacity of their national 
organisations to form alliances with backsliding states within the EU’s intergovernmental institutions.  
We also tested whether the strategic interests of national parties at the domestic level may 
impact MEP voting behaviour. It appears that domestic electoral pressure from the PRR does not play 
a significant role in influencing MEPs to vote against sanctions on fundamental values. This is 
consistent with the more general finding in the literature on political competition in the EP, which finds 
that EPGs have not significantly shifted their policy positions in light of Eurosceptical challenges 
(McDonnell & Werner, 2019; Meijers & van der Veer, 2019a). The possibility that support for EU 
sanctions on Member States could be portrayed domestically by the PRR as centre-right support for an 
overbearing EU does not seem to factor much into MEPs considerations.  
Two other strategic variables, however, appear to play a role in explaining EPP MEPs voting 
behaviour on fundamental values. First, MEPs from the Visegrad countries are less likely to vote for 
sanctions than other MEPs. This is an intriguing finding when we consider that, among Visegrad 
countries, only Hungary had a governing party within the EPP continuously, for the entire period 
covered by this study. Plausibly, even parties who are in opposition domestically within the EPP see 
the long-term strategic interests of their nation as bound up with the other Visegrad countries and so are 
reluctant to take a stand against them on fundamental issues. Finally, we found that being from a 
Member State that performs less well on democratic indicators will make a MEP less likely to vote in 
favour of sanctions. We have categorised this finding as most likely to have a strategic explanation. 
Essentially, MEPs from Member States with lower democratic performance may be concerned about 
becoming targets of resolutions in the future. They may therefore seek to render the process ineffective 
by voting against resolutions, or else they may wish to demonstrate solidarity with targeted member 
states to secure reciprocity in the future. We should not, however, discount the possibility of a 
constructivist explanation behind this finding. It is possible that MEPs from Member States with a lower 
democratic performance are less attached to fundamental values than other MEPs and are thereby less 
willing to make a fuss over their protection.  
By widening out the potential strategic variables that have influenced EPP voting behaviour 





accounts. However, we have not neglected the importance of constructivist variables in adding further 
complexity. What we find corroborates previous accounts.       
As expected, both Euroscepticism and an authoritarian positioning of an MEP's national party 
on the GAL/TAN axis are strong predictors of opposition to the EP resolutions under study. An 
unexpected finding within our descriptive statistics on MEP voting behaviour by country lends further 
credence to these ideological factors. Across EPP MEPs from all Member States, we find a sharp dip 
in support for fundamental values resolutions in 2015, following the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis 
(see Figure 3) Indeed, the Hungarian Government was strongly opposed to the influx of asylum seekers, 
criticizing the welcoming approach of German chancellor Merkel, and ordering the construction of a 
fortified fence at its southern border (Csehi & Zgut, 2020). This decision in turn was criticised by a 
number of Member State governments. However, it also triggered support from right-wing parties, as 
well as some members of the EPP. There are therefore grounds to link EPP MEPs implicit backing of 
Fidesz’s tough stance at the time and their unwillingness to promote sanctions against illiberal 
backsliding in the EU. Based on our results, we can cautiously suggest that EPP MEPs do not simply 
support Fidesz because they have self-interested reasons for doing so, but because they share some of 
the principles that Fidesz claims to defend.  
On the basis of these findings, we achieve a better appreciation of the ways in which party 
politics can either help or hinder the defence of fundamental values in the EU. Undoubtedly, the EPP’s 
opposition is one of the key reasons for the EU’s long period of inaction against fundamental values 
violations in Hungary. Conversely, the party group’s change of heart since September 2018 has 
removed a major obstacle to further sanctions in this particular case. How this change has taken place, 
and what role intra-party disagreement has had in bringing it about, has wider implications for 
understanding the conditions under which the EU can be expected to act against backsliding on 
fundamental values in the future. In this regard, we offer three general concluding points.  
First, our results suggest that the standard cost-benefit explanation for why the EPP moved from 
an accommodative to a confrontational stance regarding Fidesz must be broadened to include certain 
non-EPG strategic interests and constructivist motivations. While the EPG’s changing strategic interests 
are likely to influence the position of all EPP MEP’s similarly over time, the cost-benefit analysis for 
each individual MEP varies widely on the basis of other factors. For example, given the ideological 
sacrifice, it is significantly costlier for an MEP falling at the GAL end of the ideological spectrum to 
protect Fidesz for strategic reasons than it is for an MEP who subscribes to TAN values. As such, when 
the EPG-strategic reasons for protecting Fidesz begin to weaken for all EPP MEP’s, this is likely to 
have a bigger and more immediate impact on the voting behaviour of liberal leaning politicians over 
time. For politicians who have consistently supported EP sanctions since 2010, or opposed them as late 
as September 2018, the weight of ideological factors would appear to be paramount, trumping EPG 





on whether an MEP is from a Visegard Member State or a Member State with low democratic 
performance, or whether their national party is in government at the time of a vote.  
Second, with good reason, this and other studies have explored the EPP as a case for 
understanding EP inaction on questions of fundamental values. As the EU’s quintessential democratic 
body, the EP’s reluctance to stand united and firmly against backsliding on fundamental values is an 
intriguing and important object of study. Yet, as our results suggests, intergovernmental logics go a 
long way towards explaining the EPP’s behaviour, which has until now mostly been analysed as a 
partisan response. It is widely recognised that individual governments and the collectives of the Council 
and European Council have been insipid in their response to backsliding states. The contrasting 
approaches of the Council and the Commission in exerting social pressure on backsliding states lends 
credence to this perspective (Seidelmeier 2017; Pech and Scheppele 2017). As Seidelmeier (2017) 
explains, the Commission has been able to target backsliding states individually and in a public fashion 
through its development and use of the Rule of Law Framework. This is conspicuously different than 
the Council’s best effort, namely the Rule of Law Dialogues, which does not directly target individual 
member states but instead takes on a light-touch thematic focus in their annual discussions. The lack of 
open criticism by members of national governments across Europe against specific Member States on 
the issue of backsliding (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017: 332) only reinforces the point. To this extent, 
the respective dynamics explaining the lack of action within the intergovernmental institutions of the 
EU and the EP might not be so distinct. Rather, the constraints facing the Council and the European 
Council seem to bleed into the EP, to the extent that EPP MEPs are influenced by the strategic interests 
of their national parties at the European level when in government.  
Finally, by looking at the evolution of EPP MEPs voting behaviour on these issues over time, 
we have seen that there is a slide from an accommodating tendency to a more confrontational tendency. 
Two, non-exclusive processes might be at play here. First, if we take a strategic perspective and assume 
the predominance of EPG strategic interests, then it may be the case that the EPG’s strategic interests 
have changed over time: the benefits of Hungarian membership fell while the costs rose, thereby 
depriving the EPG of its key reasons for protecting Fidesz. In the past decade, Fidesz has indeed not 
been the most loyal. For instance, it opposed the EPP party line in September 2015 by voting down the 
Commission’s proposal for the relocation of refugees throughout the Union (VoteWatch, 2016) and, in 
June 2014, Viktor Orbàn also voted against the EPP’s official candidate for the European Commission 
Presidency, Jean-Claude Juncker, in the European Council. In parallel, the fact that the situation with 
regard to fundamental values has continued to deteriorate in Hungary over the EP’s past two terms–and 
that breaches have multiplied in other EU countries such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Malta or 
Bulgaria–might have rendered systematic opposition to EU intervention untenable. In other words, the 
deteriorating situation may have made it harder for EPP MEPs to publicly deny the problem, while 
preserving their reputation within the EP and avoiding tensions with the S&D and Renew Europe 





then we may strike an optimistic note: just as strategic interests may be an obstacle to protecting 
fundamental values, they can also come to enable action.  
Second, beyond these strategic concerns, there may also be constructivist factors at play. 
Simply, a process of political learning may have been taking place within the EPP, where the 
accumulation of evidence on backsliding and arguments in favour of taking a stand have progressively 
convinced conservative MEPs to support sanctions. In 2012, EPP MEPs might have genuinely believed 
that claims about democratic backsliding in Hungary coming from the left-hand side of the EP were 
overstated and political informed. In 2018, it becomes far harder to minimize the reach of Fidesz’s 
breaches, or to see the Hungarian situation as an isolated case. Further research using qualitative 
analysis of debates on fundamental values and direct engagement with MEPs could serve to disentangle 
the respective role of strategic calculations, and deeper forms of political learning in motivating EPP 
MEPs to support sanctions against rule of law breaches from members of their own group.  
The importance of ideological factors in influencing voting behaviour on fundamental values, 
on the other hand, is cause for concern as it may prove to be a far more resilient obstacle to partisan 
action against fundamental values violations. While incentives can evolve over time and push rational 
actors towards a change of course, principled positions are far more rigid. There are also few reasons 
to believe that conservative parties in the EP will become any more liberal over time: in the past few 
decades most centre-right parties in Europe have shifted to the right on the GAL/TAN axis, avowedly 
to keep up with increasingly popular radical right parties (Bale, 2003; Herman & Muldoon, 2018; 
Wagner & Meyer, 2016). Right-wing authoritarianism may thus not only prove one of the key drivers 
of democratic backsliding within certain EU Member States, but also one of the main stumbling blocks 
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Appendix 1: 28 EP resolutions voted between 2011 and 2019 related to fundamental value 
violations by Member States and EU intervention 
 
Date Vote 
28/03/2019 2018/2965(RSP)  Resolution on the situation of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in 
the EU, specifically in Malta and Slovakia 
13/02/2019 2018/2684(RSP)  Resolution on experiencing a backlash in women's rights and gender equality in 
the EU  
12/02/2019 2017/2089(INI)  Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the 
EU institutional framework 
16/01/2019 2018/2103(INI)  Situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2017  
14/11/2018 2018/2886(RSP)  Resolution on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights** 
13/11/2018 2018/2844(RSP)  Resolution on the rule of law in Romania  
13/11/2018 2018/2036(INI) Minimum standards for minorities in the EU  
12/09/2018 2017/2131(INL) Situation in Hungary 
19/04/2018 2018/2619(RSP)Resolution on the need to establish a European values instrument to support civil 
society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and 
national level 
19/04/2018 2018/2628(RSP)  Resolution on protection of investigative journalists in Europe: the case of Slovak 
journalist Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová 
01/03/2018 2018/2541(RSP)  Resolution on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards 
the situation in Poland  
01/03/2018 2017/2125(INI) Annual report on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2016 
15/11/2017 2017/2931(RSP)  Resolution on the situation of the rule of law and democracy in Poland 
15/11/2017 2017/2935(RSP)  Resolution on the rule of law in Malta  
17/05/2017 2017/2656(RSP) Resolution on the situation in Hungary  
13/12/2016 2016/2009(INI) Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015   
25/10/2016 2015/2254(INL)  Establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights 
14/09/2016 2016/2774(RSP)  Resolution on the recent developments in Poland and their impact on fundamental 
rights as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
13/04/2016 2015/3031(RSP)  Resolution on the situation in Poland 
08/09/2015 2014/2254(INI)  Situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-2014)  
16/12/2015 2015/2935(RSP)  Resolution on the situation in Hungary  
10/06/2015 2015/2700(RSP) Resolution on the situation of Hungary** 
27/02/2014 2013/2078(INI)  Situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2012)  
03/07/2013 2012/2130(INI)  Situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to 
the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012)** 
21/05/2013 2011/2246(INI)  EU Charter: standard settings for media freedom across the EU  
12/12/2012 2011/2069(INI)  Situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010-2011)  
16/02/2012 2012/2511(RSP) Resolution on the recent political developments in Hungary 
10/03/2011 2011/2510(RSP)  Resolution on media law in Hungary ** 
 
Table SI 1: List of all resolutions. 







Figure SI 1: Cohesion scores of all resolutions.  
Also indicates the average cohesion score of the EPP across the 7th and 8th term of the EP 
(full black line); the average cohesion score for votes in the policy field of Justice and Civil 























Appendix 2: Results of the conditional risk set model excluding Hungary. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Government 0.96 0.97 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
V4 1.09 1.05 0.94 0.74** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) 
Hungary 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 




1.76 1.67 5.38*** 4.65*** 
 (0.76) (0.73) (2.09) (1.83) 
EPP Advantage  1.00  0.99*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
EU Position   1.18*** 1.25*** 
   (0.06) (0.07) 
GAL-TAN   0.66*** 0.66*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 3865 3839 3793 3768 
 
Table SI 2: Results of the analysis excluding Hungary.  




























 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Government -0.55*** -0.34** -0.38*** -0.19* 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
V4 -0.60*** -1.27*** -0.33 -0.93*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) 
Hungary -1.45*** -1.50*** -1.59*** -1.67*** 




2.71*** 1.22* 2.47*** 1.03 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.62) (0.68) 
EPP Advantage  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
EU-Position   0.42*** 0.41*** 
   (0.06) (0.05) 
Gal/Tan   -0.47*** -0.47*** 
   (0.15) (0.14) 
2013 2.40*** 2.48*** 2.49*** 2.55*** 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) 
2014 3.29*** 3.43*** 3.40*** 3.48*** 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) 
2015 -0.43 -0.42 -0.39 -0.36 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) 
2016 3.01*** 2.93*** 3.13*** 3.02*** 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) 
2017 4.02*** 3.83*** 4.25*** 4.04*** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
2018 5.59*** 5.36*** 5.91*** 5.69*** 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) 
2019 3.76*** 3.50*** 3.92*** 3.63*** 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) 
Constant -4.24*** -2.57*** -6.61*** -4.97*** 
 (0.61) (0.66) (0.68) (0.77) 
Observations 4131 4110 4083 4063 
 
Table SI 3: Logistic Regression Model with fixed effects at the level of years.  
Standard errors are clustered by MEP. The coefficients for the yearly dummies are generally 
positive and in size. This indicates that the likelihood of voting in favour of one of the 
resolutions increases from year to year. The substantive coefficients are largely similar, even 
though the variable for government participation is not significant in the full model, while the 
V4 variable is significant throughout all models. The Lidem index is not significant in the full 










Figure SI 2: Figure plots the coefficients of the fixed effects model visually 
This shows a general upward trend in the size of the country dummy coefficients over time. 











































 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Government 0.82*** 0.85** 0.81*** 0.82*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
V4 0.87 0.76* 0.89 0.79** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Hungary 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 




3.89*** 2.83** 5.14*** 4.20*** 
 (1.63) (1.22) (1.69) (1.43) 
EPP Advantage  1.00*  1.00* 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GAL-TAN   1.20*** 1.22*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
EU Position   0.84*** 0.85*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 4084 4058 4014 3989 
 
Table SI 4: Results of the conditional risk set model with a continuous Gal-Tan variable as 
opposed to a dummy.  
Hazard Ratios; Standard errors in parentheses* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. The results 
























 Count Mean SD Min max 
government 5644 .47 .49 0 1 
V4 5643 .21 .40 0 1 
Hungary 5644 .19 .39 0 1 
EU Position 5563 5.92 1.06 2.64 7 
Gal-Tan 5644 .52 .49 0 1 
EPP 




5641 .72 .12 .40 .91 
Observations 5644     
 


































Figure SI 3: Average votes in favour over time, by nationality of EPP MEPs (smoothed). As 
shown here, this positive evolution over time holds for EPP MEPs from most Member States, 
with some notable exceptions: Hungarian MEPs, whose votes remain consistently opposed to 
EP resolutions, as well as EPP MEPs from Belgium, Cyprus, and Luxembourg, who remain 
in favour of resolutions during the period under study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
